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Volume 1: Issue 2
The Role of Patent Eligibility in Policing Claim Scope
Four Supreme Court decisions dating back to the 1970s and early 1980s (Benson,1 
Flook,2 Chakrabarty,3 and Diehr4) provide the foundation for the modern doctrine of patent 
eligibility. The criterion for patent eligibility established by these cases is easy to state, at 
least in the abstract. Under the controlling precedent, a patent claim limited to a man-made 
invention falling within the statutory categories established under Section 101 (processes, 
compositions of matter, machines, and articles of manufacture) is generally treated as patent 
eligible.5 However, a patent claim is patent ineligible (and hence invalid) if it “claims” or 
´SDWHQWVµDVRFDOOHG´IXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHµ6SHFLÀFH[DPSOHVRIIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHV
WKDWKDYHEHHQLGHQWLÀHGE\WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLQFOXGHQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQDSK\VLFDO
phenomena, principles of nature and abstract ideas. To my mind, the designations natural 
phenomena, physical phenomena, principles of nature and laws of nature are all essentially 
V\QRQ\PRXVDWOHDVWDVXVHGLQWKLVFRQWH[WVRIRUVLPSOLFLW\WKURXJKRXWWKHUHVWRIWKLV
article I simply refer to the two fundamental categories of abstract ideas and natural 
phenomena.
Most of the Supreme Court’s treatment of patent eligibility has focused on the “abstract 
idea” category of fundamental principle, including Benson, Flook, Diehr and the recent Bilski 
II decision.6 The only Supreme Court decisions to address the other category of fundamental 
principle are Chakrabarty and J.E.M., both of which rejected (at least implicitly) the 
FRQWHQWLRQWKDWDJHQHWLFDOO\PRGLÀHGRUJDQLVPLVDSDWHQWLQHOLJLEOHQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQ7 
Moreover, since the enactment of the 1952 patent statute the Supreme Court has never found 
a patent claim patent ineligible for claiming a natural phenomenon. Some would argue that 
earlier decisions of the Court found claims directed towards biological materials patent 
ineligible, most notably Funk Brothers8 and American Fruit Growers,9 but in my view 
*   Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri—Kansas City School of Law.
1.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
2.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
3.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
4.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
5.  35 U.S.C. § 101.
6.  Bilski v. Kappos (Bilski II), 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
7.  J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
$P)UXLW*URZHUV,QFY%URJGH[&R86
9.  Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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10.  This interpretation of Funk BrothersZDVSXWIRUZDUGLQDQDPLFXVFXULDHEULHIÀOHGE\$OQ\ODP3KDUPD-
ceuticals in support of Myriad Genetics in its appeal to the Federal Circuit of the decision in Ass’n for Mo-
OHFXODU%LRORJ\Y863DWHQW	7UDGHPDUN2IÀFH, Federal Circuit docket number 2010-1406.  I commented 
upon the Alynlam brief on my blog, available at http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2010/11/amicus-
EULHIÀOHGE\DO\QODPKWPO
11.  130 S. Ct. at 3236 (Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., Sotomayor, J., concurring).
12.  In re Bilski (Bilski I), 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
these cases are addressing issues distinct from the modern doctrine of patent eligibility, 
DQGWRWKHH[WHQWWKH\PLJKWKDYHKDGDQ\EHDULQJRQSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\WKH\KDYHEHHQ
effectively overruled by more recent Supreme Court precedent, most particularly 
Chakrabarty.10
While the Supreme Court has been consistent in maintaining that fundamental 
principles cannot be patented, a striking aspect of the Supreme Court precedent in this 
DUHDLVWKHODFNRIDQ\PHDQLQJIXOFRKHUHQWJXLGDQFHDVWRMXVWH[DFWO\ZKDWLWPHDQV
for a claim to “claim a fundamental principle.”  This ambiguity was noted recently in a 
concurrence by Justice Stevens to Bilski II, wherein he complained: 
The Court, in sum, never provides a satisfying account of what constitutes 
DQXQSDWHQWDEOHDEVWUDFWLGHD>,QWKLVFDVHIRUH[DPSOHWKH@&RXUW
essentially asserts its conclusion that petitioners’ application claims an ab-
stract idea. This mode of analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the cor-
rect outcome in this case, but it also means that the Court’s musings on this 
issue stand for very little.11
Justice Stephen correctly recognizes the lack of Supreme Court guidance on what it 
means to patent an abstract idea, but I would point out that the Court has provided even 
less guidance with respect to natural phenomena.
The Federal Circuit has also noted the ambiguity of the Supreme Court’s patent 
HOLJLELOLW\SUHFHGHQWDQGWKHSUDFWLFDOGLIÀFXOW\ORZHUFRXUWVIDFHLQDWWHPSWLQJWRDSSO\
WKHDEVWUDFWVWDQGDUGWRDFWXDOFODLPVSDUWLFXODUO\FODLPVGLUHFWHGWRWZHQW\²ÀUVWFHQWXU\
WHFKQRORJ\WKDWLVGLIÀFXOWWRDQDORJL]HWRWKHFODLPVDQDO\]HGLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW
decisions establishing the controlling precedent. I believe it was largely this ambiguity 
that motivated the Federal Circuit in In re Bilski (Bilski I) to create the machine or 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQWHVW0257DVWKHVROHDQGGHÀQLWLYHWHVWIRUSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\LQDQ
DWWHPSWWRSURYLGHWKHORZHUFRXUWVDQG863DWHQWDQG7UDGHPDUN2IÀFH372ZLWKD
more objective and administrable test.12
I. The Effect of Bilski II on the Criterion for Patent Eligibility
Prior to Bilski I, the prevailing view of the patent community was that patent eligibility 
hinges upon whether or not a claim wholly preempts the practical applications of a 
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13.  See infra Part III.
14.  Id.
15.  Donald Chisum has made a similar observation.  See Donald S. Chisum, Patenting Intangible Methods: 
Revisiting Benson (1972) After Bilksi 1 (Working Paper, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698724.
16.  Gerry J. Elman & Jerome R. Smith, Jr., What Kinds of Inventive Processes Are Patentable?, ELMAN TECH. 
LAW, P.C. (June 30, 2010), http://elman.com/2010/06/bilskireport-elman-smith/.
17.  See infra Parts III, IV. See also Mark A. Lemley et al., Life after Bilski, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1725009.
18.  Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922 (July 27, 2010).
fundamental principle, which I refer to as the “preemption test.”13 Under this test, a claim 
is patent ineligible if it effectively preempts all substantial practical applications of the 
fundamental principle. However, in 2008, in an attempt to impose more objectivity and 
predictability on the heretofore vaguely articulated doctrine, the en banc Federal Circuit in 
Bilski I HVWDEOLVKHG0257DVWKHVROHDQGGHÀQLWLYHWHVWIRUWKHSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\RIDOOSURFHVV
claims (leaving largely unresolved the appropriate test for patent eligibility of product claims).
But the preeminence of MORT was to prove short-lived, with the Supreme Court 
intervening in 2010 with its Bilski IIGHFLVLRQZKLFKH[SOLFLWO\KHOGWKDWZKLOH0257
FDQEHKLJKO\SUREDWLYHRISDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\LWLVQRWWKHVROHDQGGHÀQLWLYHWHVWBilski II 
DOVRPDNHVFOHDUDWOHDVWLPSOLFLWO\WKDWDÀQGLQJRISUHHPSWLRQLVQRWDSUHUHTXLVLWHIRU
invalidating a claim for lack of patent eligibility.14 But as pointed out by Justice Stevens, 
Bilski II provides no additional guidance with respect to what the test for patent eligibility 
LVRWKHUWKDQDQDGPRQLWLRQWRFRQVXOWWKHSDWHQWVWDWXWHIRULWVGHÀQLWLRQRIWKHWHUP
“process,” and to look “to the guideposts in Benson, Flook, and Diehr.”15 The essence of 
Bilski II was succinctly captured by two commentators who characterized the decision as 
the Supreme Court pushing a reset button on the doctrine of patent eligibility.16
:KLOHQHLWKHUWKHSUHHPSWLRQWHVWQRU0257FRQVWLWXWHVWKHGHÀQLWLYHWHVWIRUSDWHQW
eligibility, Bilski II clearly permits lower courts the discretion to use these tests in assessing 
patent eligibility. In the absence of any other meaningful objective criteria to guide the 
LQTXLU\,SUHGLFWWKDWWKHFRXUWVDQG372ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRUHO\KHDYLO\DQGLQVRPHFDVHV
H[FOXVLYHO\RQWKHVHWHVWVDQGHDUO\LQGLFDWLRQVDUHWKDWWKLVLVWKHFDVHLQWKH)HGHUDO
Circuit, district courts, and the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI).17 
%RWKRIWKHVHDSSURDFKHVWRDVVHVVLQJSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\DUHVSHFLÀFDOO\LGHQWLÀHGLQWKH
PTO’s Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in 
View of Bilski v. Kappos.18
6LJQLÀFDQWO\ERWKWKHSUHHPSWLRQWHVWDQG0257WUHDWFODLPVFRSHDVDFULWLFDO
FRQVLGHUDWLRQLQDVVHVVLQJSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\'LVFUHWLRQDU\ÁH[LELOLW\LQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQ
of these tests effectively empowers the courts and PTO to invoke patent eligibility as a 
doctrinal policy lever for policing claim scope. In the remainder of this essay, I discuss the 
role of patent eligibility in regulating claim scope.
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19.  The role of patent eligibility in policing claim scope was recently noted by Lemley et al., supra note 17.
20.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305-06 (1980).
21.  500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
II. Patent Eligibility as a Restriction on Claim Scope
While patent eligibility can be conceptualized as a threshold screen to determine whether 
or not an innovation can be patented, in many cases the doctrine functions more as a tool for 
calibrating the scope of protection afforded an invention.19)RUH[DPSOHLQChakrabarty the 
372UHMHFWHGWKHFODLPDWLVVXHLQWKHDSSHDOZKLFKEURDGO\UHFLWHVDJHQHWLFDOO\PRGLÀHG
bacterium per se, but allowed other claims reciting Dr. Chakrabarty’s invention in more 
narrow terms.206RPHRIWKHLQLWLDOO\DOORZHGFODLPVDSSHDURQWKHLUIDFHWREHTXLWHEURDG
including claims reciting the method of producing the new bacteria, and claims reciting an 
LQRFXOXPFRPSULVHGRIWKHQHZEDFWHULDLQFRPELQDWLRQZLWKDFDUULHUPDWHULDOÁRDWLQJRQZDWHU
5HFDOOWKDWWKHGHÀQLQJIHDWXUHRI'U&KDNUDEDUW\·VEDFWHULDZDVWKHLUDELOLW\WREUHDN
down multiple components of crude oil, the primary utility of which was believed to be in 
the treatment of oil spills. Practically speaking, use of the bacteria for this purpose would 
DOPRVWFHUWDLQO\UHTXLUHWKHXVHRIDQLQRFXOXPFDSDEOHRIÁRDWLQJRQZDWHUVRLWZRXOG
seem that the originally allowed claims would have provided the inventor with reasonably 
H[SDQVLYHSDWHQWFRYHUDJHIRUKLVLQYHQWLRQ,WZDVRQO\DWWKHSRLQWZKHUH'U&KDNUDEDUW\
sought a claim broadly reciting the bacteria per seWKDWWKHSDWHQWRIÀFHEDONHGLQYRNLQJWKH
doctrine of patent eligibility in an attempt to limit the scope of the allowed claims.
While the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the PTO’s decision in Chakrabarty, in 
other cases the PTO has been more successful in invoking the doctrine of patent eligibility 
to rein in the scope of patent protection afforded to an otherwise patentable invention. For 
H[DPSOHLQIn re Nuijten the inventor had come up with a method for reducing distortion in 
a digital signal caused by the introduction of a “watermark,” which involved embedding the 
watermark’s signal with supplemental data.21 The PTO allowed ten claims directed toward 
the process itself, and another four claims directed towards articles of manufacture used to 
perform the process, including a claim to a “storage medium having stored thereon a signal 
with embedded supplemental data.”  These claims would appear to provide relatively broad 
protection for the invention, but in this case the inventor again asked for more, this time in 
the form of claims reciting the “signal” per se. The PTO rejected this broad claim to a signal 
as patent ineligible, unconstrained as it was to any tangible medium, and in this case the 
)HGHUDO&LUFXLWDIÀUPHGKROGLQJWKDWWKHVLJQDOGLGQRWIDOOZLWKLQDQ\RIWKHIRXUVWDWXWRU\
categories of patentable subject matter.
III. The Preemption Test Explicitly Focuses on Claim Scope
The role of preemption analysis in assessing patent eligibility dates back to Benson, 
wherein the Court opined that if the patent ineligible claims had been allowed to issue in 
22.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
23.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 
861RLQWHUQDOTXRWHVRPLWWHG:/
372,QWHULP*XLGHOLQHVIRU([DPLQDWLRQRI3DWHQW$SSOLFDWLRQVIRU3DWHQW6XEMHFW0DWWHU(OLJLELOLW\,Q-
WHULP6XEMHFW0DWWHU(OLJLELOLW\*XLGHOLQHV2II*D]3DW2IÀFH1RY
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a patent, they would have entirely preempted every “substantial practical application” of 
a mathematical algorithm, such that the practical effect would have been patent on the 
mathematical algorithm itself.22  Prior to Bilski I, a claim’s preemptive effect was often 
treated as the primary, if not only, relevant consideration in assessing whether a claim is 
patent ineligible for patenting a fundamental principle.
)RUH[DPSOHLQDEULHIVXEPLWWHGWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKLabCorp, 
the United States government as amicus curiae focused entirely on issues of preemption 
in considering the patent eligibility of the claim, summing up the applicable test for 
patent eligibility as “no one can patent process that comprises every substantial practical 
application of a law of nature, because such a patent in practical effect would be a patent on 
the law of nature itself.”23 The government opined that under the broad construction adopted 
in the lower courts the claim appeared to cover all substantial practical applications of a 
natural phenomenon, which would in its view render the claim patent ineligible. However, 
LWZHQWRQWRREVHUYHWKDWVLQFHWKHFODLPLVOLPLWHGWRDVVD\LQJD´ERG\ÁXLGµUHVHDUFKHUV
or physicians might be able to employ the natural phenomenon implicated by the claim 
(i.e., the correlation between total homocysteine and vitamin B) without infringing the 
SDWHQWPHUHO\E\XVLQJDQDOWHUQDWHDSSURDFKWKDWGRHVQRWHQWDLODVVD\LQJDERG\ÁXLG
implying that this opportunity to decide around the claim would render it patent eligible. 
The government’s brief goes on to point out that a more narrowly drafted diagnostic claim, 
covering some but not all substantial practical applications of a natural phenomenon, should 
be considered clearly patent eligible.
Similarly, in a guidance document issued shortly after the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in LabCorp, the PTO set forth a test for patent eligibility that focuses largely on 
whether the claim covers every substantial practical application of principle.24 A test based 
on preemption would hold an obvious appeal for the PTO, because it has the potential to 
SURYLGHLWVFRUSVRIH[DPLQHUVZLWKDUHODWLYHO\REMHFWLYHDQGUHYLHZDEOHFULWHULRQIRUSDWHQW
HOLJLELOLW\%\IRFXVLQJH[SOLFLWO\RQFODLPVFRSHSUHHPSWLRQDQDO\VLVLVTXLWHDQDORJRXV
WRRWKHUSDWHQWDELOLW\DQDO\VHVSHUIRUPHGE\SDWHQWH[DPLQHUVVXFKDVH[DPLQDWLRQIRU
novelty, nonobviousness, and enablement. 
While the preemption test is undoubtedly useful and relevant, the Supreme Court has 
unambiguously established that preemption is not the sole test for patent eligibility, and 
WKDWDÀQGLQJRISUHHPSWLRQLVQRWDSUHUHTXLVLWHWRFODLPLQYDOLGDWLRQEDVHGRQSDWHQW
ineligibility. In FlookIRUH[DPSOHWKHSDWHQWDSSOLFDQWDUJXHGWKDWXQGHUBenson its claim 
should be patent eligible because it did not preempt all substantial practical applications of 
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25.  Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90 (1978).
26.  Id.
27.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981); Bilski II6&W´>/@LPLWLQJDQDEVWUDFW
LGHDWRRQHÀHOGRIXVHDUHDGGLQJWRNHQSRVWVROXWLRQFRPSRQHQWV>GRHV@QRWPDNHWKHFRQFHSWSDWHQWDEOHµ
28.  130 S. Ct. at 3231.
a mathematical algorithm, implicitly reading Benson as though it established preemption as 
WKHGHÀQLWLYHWHVWIRUSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\25 The Court, however, rejected this argument.
The Flook Court agreed with the patent applicant that since the claim was limited to 
applications in the petrochemical industry, it did not “wholly preempt the mathematical 
formula,” and left other uses of the formula in the public domain. Nonetheless, the 
&RXUWZHQWRQWRÀQGWKHFODLPSDWHQWLQHOLJLEOHFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKLQJWKHSULQFLSOHWKDW
SUHHPSWLRQLVQRWDSUHUHTXLVLWHIRUSDWHQWLQHOLJLELOLW\7KH&RXUWMXVWLÀHGLWVGHFLVLRQ
by noting that the prohibition against patenting a fundamental principle cannot be 
circumvented by attempting to limit its use to a particular technological environment, or 
E\DGGLQJLQVLJQLÀFDQW´SRVWVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\µWRDFODLP266XEVHTXHQW6XSUHPH&RXUW
GHFLVLRQVKDYHH[SOLFLWO\FLWHGWKLVDVSHFWRIFlook with approval.27
Bilski IIUHDIÀUPHGWKLVSULQFLSOHRIFlook by holding that dependent claims limited 
WRVSHFLÀFSUDFWLFDODSSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHDEVWUDFWLGHDDWLVVXHLQWKDWFDVHULVNKHGJLQJ
and thus clearly not preemptive of all practical applications of the abstract idea, were 
nonetheless patent ineligible.  Nevertheless, Bilski IIGRHVVHHPWRDVFULEHDVLJQLÀFDQW
role to the preemption test in analyzing for patent eligibility, pointing out that some of the 
EURDGHUFODLPVDWLVVXHLQWKHFDVH´SUHHPSWXVHRI>ULVNKHGJLQJ@LQDOOÀHOGVDQGZRXOG
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”28 While preemption is clearly not a 
SUHUHTXLVLWHIRUDÀQGLQJRISDWHQWLQHOLJLELOLW\LWZRXOGVHHPWREHVXIÀFLHQW1RWKLQJ
in the Court’s decisions would suggest that a claim could preempt all substantial practical 
applications of a fundamental principle and nonetheless retain patent eligibility.
While the preemption test does impose some order on the otherwise amorphous patent 
HOLJLELOLW\LQTXLU\LWQRQHWKHOHVVSURYLGHVFRXUWVDPSOHURRPWRH[HUFLVHMXGLFLDOGLVFUHWLRQ
and apply the test in a manner that furthers perceived public policy objectives. For 
H[DPSOHDVVDQFWLRQHGE\Flook, courts have interpreted the preemption test in a manner 
such that literal preemption of all uses of a fundamental principle is not necessary in order 
for a claim to fail the test. Rather, the test is often stated as whether the claim preempts 
substantially all practical uses of the fundamental principle, with terms like “substantial” 
DQG´SUDFWLFDOµSURYLGLQJWKHFRXUWVDQG372ÁH[LELOLW\LQDSSO\LQJWKHWHVWWRDFKLHYHWKH
“right” outcome.
)RUH[DPSOHLQPrometheus I, the inventors had discovered a correlation between the 
level of certain drug metabolites observed in a patient’s body and optimal drug dosage, 
and obtained patent claims directed towards methods of using the correlation to determine 
29.  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus I), 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1715-16 (S.D. 
Cal. 2008).
30.  Id.
31.  Id.
32.  Id.
33.  Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs. (Prometheus II), 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
34.  Id. at 1349-50.
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whether to increase or decrease the amount of drug being given to the patient.29 The district 
court invoked the preemption test and held the claims patent ineligible for preempting 
all substantial practical applications of the correlation, which the court characterized as a 
natural phenomenon.30 The patent owner had argued that the claims did not preempt all practical 
XVHVRIWKHFRUUHODWLRQDQGEROVWHUHGLWVDUJXPHQWE\VSHFLÀFDOO\LGHQWLI\LQJVL[XVHVRIWKH
correlation that it alleged were not covered by the claims.31 The district court rejected 
WKLVDUJXPHQWKRZHYHUDSSDUHQWO\FRQFOXGLQJWKDWQRQHRIWKHVHDSSOLFDWLRQVZHUHVXIÀFLHQWO\
“substantial” and/or “practical” enough to satisfy its interpretation of the preemption test.32
On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit in Prometheus II reversed, applying a much 
more permissive interpretation of the preemption test to the challenged claims.33 As 
articulated by the Federal Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Lourie, a claim fails 
the preemption test only if it would entirely preempt the use of a fundamental principle.34 
Conspicuously absent in the Federal Circuit’s formulation of the test is any reference to 
“substantial” or “practical” uses of the fundamental principle.
Turning to the claims, Judge Lourie concluded that because they use the natural 
SKHQRPHQDLQDVHULHVRIVSHFLÀFVWHSVWKH\GRQRWSUHHPSWDOOXVHVRIWKHQDWXUDO
phenomena. Notably, the Court’s decision offers no suggestion as to what sorts of 
applications of the fundamental principle fall outside the scope of the claims, and makes 
QRUHIHUHQFHWRWKHVL[DOOHJHGH[DPSOHVSXWIRUWKE\WKHSDWHQWRZQHU,ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDW
under Judge Lourie’s approach to preemption analysis, the fact that a fundamental principle 
LVXWLOL]HGLQDVHULHVRIVSHFLÀFVWHSVWRDFKLHYHDUHDVRQDEO\VSHFLÀFDQGSUDFWLFDOUHVXOW
LQWKLVFDVHWUHDWPHQWRIVSHFLÀFGLVHDVHE\VSHFLÀFGUXJVZLOOEHHQRXJKWRGHIHDWDQ
allegation of patent ineligibility based on preemption, regardless of claim scope. 
The divergent interpretations of the preemption test by the district court and Federal 
Circuit in Prometheus LOOXVWUDWHVWKHPDOOHDELOLW\RIWKHWHVWSURYLGLQJÁH[LELOLW\IRU
WKHFRXUWVWRH[HUFLVHGLVFUHWLRQLQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHWHVWWRSROLFHFODLPVFRSHLQD
manner the court deems to be appropriate. A court, faced with a claim it considers to be 
RYHUO\H[SDQVLYHLQVFRSHFDQHVVHQWLDOO\LJQRUHWKHH[LVWHQFHRISUDFWLFDODSSOLFDWLRQVRI
the fundamental principle that fall outside the scope of the claim by characterizing the 
unclaimed applications as “insubstantial” or “impractical,” and proceed to invalidate the 
claim for failing to preemption test. Alternatively, a court of a different mindset could easily 
uphold the validity of the same claim by concluding that the claim is not entirely preemptive, 
without necessarily identifying any meaningful unclaimed application of the principle.
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35.  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972). This aspect of patent eligibility doctrine is discussed by 
Lemley et al., supra note 17, at 17-18.
36.  Lemley et al., supra note 17.
/L]DUG7HFK,QFY(DUWK5HV0DSSLQJ,QF)G)HG&LUDIÀUPLQJZULWWHQ
description-based invalidation of claims for encompassing embodiments of the invention unknown as of the 
ÀOLQJGDWHIn re *RRGPDQ)G)HG&LUÀQGLQJDFODLPEURDGO\HQFRPSDVVLQJJH-
QHWLFDOO\PRGLÀHGPRQRFRWVDQGGLFRWVLQYDOLGIRUODFNRIHQDEOHPHQWEHFDXVHJHQHWLFDOO\PRGLÀHGPRQRFRWV
ZHUHXQNQRZQDVRIWKHÀOLQJGDWH
One interesting aspect of the “substantial practical application” implementation of the 
preemption test is the effect of after-arising advances in technology. In order for claim 
to fail the preemption test, is it necessary that the claim encompass substantially all 
practical applications of the fundamental principle that might be developed in the future, 
RULVSUHHPSWLRQRIDOOSUDFWLFDODSSOLFDWLRQVDVRIWKHÀOLQJGDWHRUSHUKDSVWKHGDWH
LQIULQJHPHQWVXIÀFLHQW",IWKHIRUPHUKRZLVDFRXUWH[SHFWHGWRDQWLFLSDWHDOOSUDFWLFDO
applications of a fundamental principle which might become available at some future date 
EDVHGRQVXEVHTXHQWDGYDQFHVLQWHFKQRORJ\",IWKHODWWHUGRHVWKLVLPSO\WKDWDFODLPWKDW
LVSDWHQWLQHOLJLEOHDWRQHSRLQWLQWLPHPLJKWEHUHQGHUHGSDWHQWHOLJLEOHE\VXEVHTXHQW
advances in technology that create new opportunities to apply the fundamental principle 
LQDSSOLFDWLRQVIDOOLQJRXWVLGHWKHVFRSHRIWKHFODLP"2UZRXOGSUHHPSWLRQDQDO\VLVEH
ORFNHGLQWRWKHVWDWHRIWKHDUWDWWKHWLPHWKHSDWHQWDSSOLFDWLRQZDVÀOHGRUSHUKDSVDW
WKHWLPHWKHFODLPZDVÀUVWDGGHGWRWKHSDWHQWDSSOLFDWLRQRUWKHGDWHWKHSDWHQWLVVXHV"
VXFKWKDWHYHQWKRXJKDIWHUWKHSDWHQWLVVXHVWKHUHH[LVWVVXEVWDQWLDOSUDFWLFDOXVHVRIWKH
fundamental principle lying outside the claim, the claim is nonetheless patent ineligible 
EHFDXVHWKHVHXVHVRQO\EHFDPHSUDFWLFDODIWHUWKHDSSOLFDWLRQZDVÀOHG"
At this point is perhaps worth noting that some language from Supreme Court precedent 
VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKDSDWHQWFODLPHQFRPSDVVHVDSSOLFDWLRQVRIDIXQGDPHQWDO
SULQFLSOH´XQNQRZQµDWWKHWLPHRILQYHQWLRQLVUHOHYDQWWRWKHTXHVWLRQRISDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\35 
7KLVDSSURDFKLVUHODWHGWRWKHSUHHPSWLRQWHVWEXWIRFXVHVVSHFLÀFDOO\RQ´XQNQRZQµ
applications of the fundamental principle, rather than “practical” applications.  This 
approach to patent eligibility does not seem to have garnered much traction in the courts 
in recent years, although Lemley et al. suggest that a focus on “unknown” uses could 
establish a meaningful doctrinal role for patent eligibility, a doctrine which they suggest is 
otherwise largely redundant with enablement and written description.36
To my mind, the doctrines of enablement and written description are perfectly capable 
and better suited for addressing the policy concerns associated with claims encompassing 
HPERGLPHQWVRIDQLQYHQWLRQXQNQRZQDVRIWKHÀOLQJGDWH3UHFHGHQWFOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHV
WKDWDFODLPUHFLWLQJHPERGLPHQWVXQNQRZQDQGXQDWWDLQDEOHDVRIWKHÀOLQJGDWHFDQEXW
GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\UXQDIRXORIWKHHQDEOHPHQWDQGZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV
and the patent eligibility doctrine should not be made available as a backdoor to achieve 
a different result.37 Instead, patent policy would be better served if the courts, most 
SDUWLFXODUO\WKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWIRFXVHGPRUHHQHUJ\RQUHÀQLQJWKHHQDEOHPHQWGRFWULQH
38.  Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Linn, J., concurring) (opining that the appro-
priate doctrinal total for policing claim scope is enablement, not written description, and bemoaning the fact 
WKDWWKH&RXUWKDV´OHIWXQUHVROYHGµWKHTXHVWLRQRIWRZKDWH[WHQWWKHHQDEOHPHQWUHTXLUHPHQWFRQVWUDLQVWKH
ability of an inventor to claim “known and unknown” embodiments of the invention).
39.  Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868-69 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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as a doctrinal tool for policing claim scope, generally applicable to embodiments of the 
FODLPHGLQYHQWLRQERWKNQRZQDQGXQNQRZQDVRIWKHÀOLQJGDWH38
IV. The Machine or Transformation Test Implicitly Addresses Claim Scope
Although Bilski II rejected the Federal Circuit’s assertion that MORT is the sole and 
GHÀQLWLYHWHVWLWE\QRPHDQVGLVDYRZHGWKHXVHRI0257LQDVVHVVLQJSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\7R
the contrary, the Court acknowledged that MORT is in many cases a “useful and important 
FOXHDQLQYHVWLJDWLYHWRROµIRUDQVZHULQJWKHXOWLPDWHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUDFODLPSDWHQWV
a fundamental principle. In view of the fact that Bilski II does not offer any alternative 
“clues” or “tools” to assist the lower courts in this regard, and the fact that a majority of the 
judges on the Federal Circuit have so recently voiced their approval of MORT, I predict that 
courts will continue to rely heavily on MORT in assessing patent eligibility.  This prediction 
LVERUQHRXWIRUH[DPSOHLQWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW·VUHFHQWPrometheus II decision, in which 
the claims were found to be patent eligible based almost entirely on a MORT analysis.
On the other hand, under Bilski II a court can at its discretion ignore MORT in its patent 
eligibility analysis. This approach can be seen in Research Corporation Technologies v. 
Microsoft, another recent Federal Circuit decision case that upheld the patent eligibility of 
the challenged claims, but this time without any reference to MORT.39
MORT can function as a doctrinal tool for policing claim scope that complements the 
SUHHPSWLRQWHVW)RUH[DPSOHLQPrometheus II the claimed invention was based on the 
GLVFRYHU\RIDFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHOHYHORIVSHFLÀFGUXJPHWDEROLWHVLQWKHSDWLHQW·V
body and the optimal dosage of the drug for that patient. The Federal Circuit stated in dicta 
that a claim broadly directed to this correlation, which could be infringed by mere mental 
steps, such as a doctor warning a patient that he should reduce his drug dosage based on the 
result of a test showing high levels of drug metabolite, would be per se patent ineligible.
 
However, in fact none of the claims were this broad, since all included additional steps of 
administering a drug to patient and or determining the level of drug metabolite in a patient’s 
body. These steps were held to be inherently transformative, thus satisfying MORT.  In 
VKRUWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIDWUDQVIRUPDWLYHVWHSOLPLWVWKHDYDLODELOLW\RISDWHQWSURWHFWLRQWR
methods of using the correlation involving actual treatment of the patient and/or analysis 
of a biological sample. As applied in Prometheus II, MORT functions to defuse concerns 
that parties like Prometheus might be able to obtain patent protection of such broad scope 
that it could be used to prevent doctors from thinking about the correlations, or from 
communicating with their patients.
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40.  Ex parte Sesek, at 1, No. 2009-0458, 2009 WL 803089 (B.P.A.I.  Mar. 25, 2009).
41.  Id. at 4-6.
42.  Bilski I, 545 F.3d 943, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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
44.  Prometheus II, 628 F.3d 1347, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
45.  In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840-41 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
46.  See id. at 839.
47.  Every Penny Counts, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2009 WL 6853402 at  2-3 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
7KHPDFKLQHSURQJRI0257FDQDOVREHHPSOR\HGWROLPLWFODLPVFRSH)RUH[DPSOH
in Ex parte Sesek, the invention was a method of “notifying a carrier in a mass mailing 
operation of an anticipated mail load to allow the carrier to adapt to the mail load instead of 
merely reacting to it.”40 The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) rejected the 
claims as patent ineligible, for failure to satisfy either prong of MORT, but did not reject 
corresponding claims limited to an apparatus for performing the method.41
/LNHWKHSUHHPSWLRQWHVW0257LVVXIÀFLHQWO\PDOOHDEOHWRSHUPLWDFRXUWWRDUULYH
at a desired outcome based on the stringency by which the test is applied. In Bilski I, the 
Federal Circuit held that the presence of a machine or transformation is not necessarily 
VXIÀFLHQWWRVDWLVI\0257SDUWLFXODUO\LIWKHLQYROYHPHQWRIDPDFKLQHRUWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
LVIRXQGWREHPHUH´H[WUDVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\µ42 The ability to dismiss machine-implemented 
RUWUDQVIRUPDWLYHVWHSVDVPHUHH[WUDVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\SURYLGHVVXEVWDQWLDOGLVFUHWLRQIRUD
court to apply to MORT in a manner that achieves the desired result.
)RUH[DPSOHLQClassen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC the Federal Circuit 
KHOGWKDWDFODLPWKDWVSHFLÀFDOO\UHFLWHGDVWHSRILPPXQL]LQJSDWLHQWVQRQHWKHOHVVIDLOHG
MORT.43 Immunizing a patient against disease clearly transforms a patient; Prometheus 
II, decided after Classen, unambiguously states that treating a patient is inherently 
transformative.447KHRQO\UDWLRQDOH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKHRXWFRPHLQClassen would appear 
WREHWKDWWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWGLVUHJDUGHGWKHLPPXQL]DWLRQVWHSDVPHUHH[WUDVROXWLRQ
DFWLYLW\DQDQDO\WLFDOH[SHGLHQWH[SOLFLWO\VDQFWLRQHGE\Bilski I. 
Similarly, in Prometheus II the Federal Circuit cited with approval In re Grams, a 1989 
Federal Circuit decision that held patent ineligible a claim directed toward a method that 
involves performing a clinical test on individuals and applying an algorithm to the data 
generated by the test.45 In a manner reminiscent of Classen, the Court simply disregarded 
the inherently transformative clinical testing step in its patent eligibility analysis as mere 
GDWDJDWKHULQJH[WUDVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\46
In Every Penny Counts v. Bank of America Corp.,47 the district court applied a similar 
DSSURDFKWRFRQFOXGHWKDWFODLPVGLUHFWHGWRZDUGDSURFHVVWKDWLQKHUHQWO\UHTXLUHVWKHXVH
of a machine nonetheless failed MORT based on its conclusion that the involvement of 
WKHPDFKLQHUHSUHVHQWHGRQO\LQVLJQLÀFDQWH[WUDVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\,QWKLVFDVHWKHGLVWULFW
FRXUWIRXQGWKDWWKHFODLPHGSURFHVVQHFHVVDULO\UHTXLUHVWKHXVHRIPDFKLQHVRUFRPSXWHUV
48.  Prometheus II, 628 F.3d at 1355.
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to work, and hence does not impose any limits on the process itself. Thus, this is another 
H[DPSOHRIXVLQJWKHH[SHGLHQWRIGHFODULQJDVWHSPHUHH[WUDVROXWLRQDFWLYLW\WRLQYDOLGDWH
a claim the court clearly considers overly broad.
V. 7KH0DQQHULQ:KLFKWKH&RXUW'HÀQHVWKH´)XQGDPHQWDO3ULQFLSOHµ
The manner in which a court or the PTO interprets the meaning of “fundamental 
SULQFLSOHµFDQGLFWDWHWKHUROHRISDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\LQSROLFLQJFODLPVFRSH)RUH[DPSOH
HYHQDQH[WUHPHO\EURDGFODLPZLOOSDVVPXVWHULIWKHFRXUWFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKH´SULQFLSOHµ
captured by the claim is not “fundamental.” We see this in Research Corporation 
Technologies, wherein the Federal Circuit held that, because the claimed method provides 
DIXQFWLRQDODQGSDOSDEOHXWLOLW\LQWKHÀHOGRIFRPSXWHUWHFKQRORJ\WKHGLVWULFWFRXUWZDV
incorrect in characterizing the idea behind the claim as “abstract.” With no “abstract idea” 
implicated by the claim, it necessarily follows that the claims could not be patent ineligible 
for claiming an abstract idea, regardless of how broadly the “non-abstract idea” behind the 
FODLPLVFODLPHG%\GHÀQLQJDEVWUDFWLGHDLQVXFKDUHVWULFWHGPDQQHUWKH&RXUWHIIHFWLYHO\
negates the role of patent eligibility in policing claim scope.  The district court, in contrast, 
KDGVXEVFULEHGWRDPRUHH[SDQVLYHGHÀQLWLRQRIZKDWLWPHDQVWREHDQ´DEVWUDFWLGHDµ
resulting in the divergent outcomes.
Different interpretations of what it means to be a “natural phenomenon” might also 
H[SODLQWKHFRQÁLFWLQJUXOLQJVHPDQDWLQJIURPWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWDQG)HGHUDO&LUFXLW
in Prometheus$VGLVFXVVHGDERYHWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWVHHPHGWRDGRSWDQXQMXVWLÀDEO\
H[SDQVLYHGHÀQLWLRQRIQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQDFKDUDFWHUL]LQJWKHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKH
PHWDEROLFEUHDNGRZQSURGXFWVRIDGHÀQHGFDWHJRU\RIQRQQDWXUDOO\RFFXUULQJGUXJVLH
certain thiopurine drugs) and the optimal dosage of the drug as a natural phenomenon. While 
WKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWGLGQRWH[SOLFLWO\DGGUHVVWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·VTXHVWLRQDEOHGHÀQLWLRQRI
QDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQLWVGHFLVLRQWRUHYHUVHWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWPLJKWEHH[SODLQHGE\DVVXPLQJ
WKDWWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWGHÀQHGWKHUHOHYDQWQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQGLIIHUHQWO\$WRQHSRLQW
in Prometheus II, WKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWH[SODLQVWKDWWKHFKDOOHQJHGFODLPVDUHGLUHFWHG
towards an application “of naturally occurring correlations between metabolite levels and 
HIÀFDF\RUWR[LFLW\DQGWKXVGRQRWZKROO\SUHHPSWDOOXVHVRIWKHUHFLWHGFRUUHODWLRQVµ48 
7KLVVWDWHPHQWVXJJHVWVWKDWSHUKDSVWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWGHÀQHGWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOH
implicated by the claims more broadly, i.e., as the general phenomenon that a correlation 
H[LVWVEHWZHHQWKHOHYHORIGUXJPHWDEROLWHLQWKHERG\DQGGUXJHIÀFDF\DQGWR[LFLW\
DVRSSRVHGWRWKHPRUHVSHFLÀFFRUUHODWLRQLQYROYLQJWKLRSXULQHGUXJVLGHQWLÀHGE\WKH
district court. As such, the Federal Circuit’s “natural phenomenon” encompassed all drugs 
JHQHUDOO\DQGWKXVZDVQRWSUHHPSWHGE\FODLPVOLPLWHGWRDVSHFLÀFFDWHJRU\RIGUXJV7KH
GLVWULFWFRXUW·V´QDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQµRQWKHRWKHUKDQGZDVOLPLWHGWRDVSHFLÀFFDWHJRU\
of drugs, which the court found to be effectively preempted by the claims.
at Stake Can Impact Patent Scope
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49.  As I pointed out in a post to my blog, I found the Federal Circuit’s attempt to distinguish the two cases 
provided by Prometheus II less than entirely convincing. Chris Holman, On Remand, Federal Circuit (Once 
Again) Decides Prometheus v. Mayo in Favor of Patent Eligibility for Methods of Treatment and Diag-
nostic Tests, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH IP BLOG (Dec. 17, 2010, 3:22 PM), http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.
com/2010/12/on-remand-federal-circuit-once-again.html.
50.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Interested Patent Law Professors in Support of Neither Party at 11, Prometheus 
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 2008-1403).
Note the analogy between what occurred in Research Corporation Technologies and the 
foregoing interpretation of Prometheus.  In both cases, the district court adopted a relatively 
narrow interpretation of the fundamental principle at stake, and found the claim invalid for 
HIIHFWLYHO\SUHHPSWLQJWKHIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOH2QDSSHDOWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWGHÀQHGWKH
fundamental principle more broadly, and based on this interpretation reversed the lower court. 
In Research Corporation TechnologiesWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWDFKLHYHGWKLVHQGE\ÀQGLQJWKDW
no fundamental principle (i.e., abstract idea) was implicated by the claims. In Prometheus, 
on the other hand, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the claims implicated a natural 
SKHQRPHQRQEXWDIWHUGHÀQLQJWKHQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQPRUHEURDGO\KDGQRWURXEOHFRQFOXGLQJ
WKDWWKHFODLPVDUHSDWHQWHOLJLEOHE\YLUWXHRIEHLQJOLPLWHGWRFHUWDLQVSHFLÀFDSSOLFDWLRQVRI
the phenomenon, i.e., a limited category of drugs.  While the Prometheus claims appeared 
RYHUO\EURDGXQGHUWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW·VQDUURZGHÀQLWLRQRIWKHQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQIURPWKH
perspective of the Federal Circuit the claims are relatively narrow, limited as they are to an 
DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQDVWKH\GHÀQHGLWWRDVSHFLÀFFDWHJRU\RIGUXJV
This interpretation of Prometheus IIPLJKWDOVRKHOSH[SODLQWKHGLIIHUHQWRXWFRPHVLQ
that case and In re Grams.49 In both cases, the challenged claims recited a method that 
involved obtaining clinical laboratory data from a patient and applying what the court 
characterized as a fundamental principle to the data, resulting in clinically useful diagnostic 
information. In PrometheusWKHFODLPLVOLPLWHGWRDIDLUO\VSHFLÀFFDWHJRU\RIGUXJV
leaving most applications of the fundamental principle outside the scope of the claims. In 
contrast, the Grams claim broadly recited applying the fundamental principle to “clinical 
ODERUDWRU\WHVWVµLQJHQHUDOUDWKHUWKDQEHLQJOLPLWHGWRDQ\VSHFLÀFFOLQLFDOODERUDWRU\
test or tests. The greater preemptive effect of Grams’ claims, in contrast with the relatively 
VSHFLÀFDSSOLFDWLRQRIDIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHFODLPHGE\3URPHWKHXVFRXOGSURYLGHD
SULQFLSOHGGLVWLQFWLRQWKDWZRXOGH[SODLQWKHGLYHUJHQWRXWFRPHVLQWKHFDVHV
Alternatively, the Federal Circuit could have arrived at the same outcome in Prometheus 
II E\ÀQGLQJWKDWWKHDOOHJHGQDWXUDOSKHQRPHQRQLGHQWLÀHGE\WKHGLVWULFWFRXUWZDVQRW
in fact “natural.”  On the initial appeal of Prometheus WRWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLW,ÀOHGDQ
DPLFXVEULHIH[SODLQLQJP\SRVLWLRQWKDWWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWKDGHUUHGLQFKDUDFWHUL]LQJD
correlation involving a synthetic, non-naturally occurring drug breakdown product as a 
natural phenomenon.50 In that brief I argued that the correlation does not and cannot occur 
naturally, since it only arises as a result of the administration of a synthetic drug to patient. 
By limiting the applicability of the doctrine of patent eligibility to claims implicating truly 
natural phenomena, courts could modulate the effect of the doctrine on claim breadth.
$VV·QIRU0ROHFXODU3DWKRORJ\Y863DWHQW	7UDGHPDUN2IÀFH)6XSSG6'1<
2010).
52.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
53.  See In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
54.  See supra Part II.
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)RUH[DPSOHFRQVLGHUWKHFDVHRIDUHVHDUFKHUZKRKDVGLVFRYHUHGDFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ
DVSHFLÀFJHQHWLFYDULDWLRQDQGWKHVXLWDELOLW\RIDSDUWLFXODUGUXJIRUDSDWLHQWEHDULQJ
that genetic variation, i.e., a personalized medicine invention. A court could reasonably 
conclude that since the correlation involves a non-naturally occurring drug, it is not a 
natural phenomenon, and thus patent eligibility is not implicated, regardless of how broadly 
the researcher chooses to claim a diagnostic method applying the correlation to healthcare. 
On the other hand, assuming that the genetic variation occurs naturally, and thus could be 
rightly characterized as a natural phenomenon, the doctrine of patent eligibility would be 
available to preclude the researcher from obtaining a claim broadly reciting the genetic 
variation per se, untethered to its correlation with a non-naturally occurring drug.
The virtue of this approach might lie in its ability to provide a principled doctrinal tool 
for distinguishing between claims broadly reciting diagnostic testing for naturally occurring 
genetic variations, which have become highly controversial and widely unpopular, and 
personalized medicine claims directed toward correlations between genetic variation and 
optimal drug treatment regimen.  It is widely believed that personalized medicine has the 
potential to play a critical role in advancing future healthcare, and should the courts decide 
to use patent eligibility to invalidate unpopular “gene patents” claims, such as those at issue 
in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology,51 it is important that they do so in a manner that does 
QRWXQGXO\SUHMXGLFHWKHDELOLW\RISHUVRQDOL]HGPHGLFLQHLQQRYDWRUVWRREWDLQDGHTXDWHSDWHQW
protection for their discoveries. This important policy objective might be achieved by limiting the 
applicability of the doctrine of patent eligibility to claims implicating truly “natural” phenomena.
VI. Policing Claim Scope by Limiting Claims to the Statutory Categories of
Under Section 101 of the patent statute, only machines, articles of manufacture, 
compositions of matter, and processes are patent eligible.52 These terms have been 
interpreted broadly, to encompass living organisms, chemical compounds, and in at least 
one case an elemental particle (Element 95, i.e., Americium).53 However, the recent decision 
in Nuijten invalidating a claim to a signal illustrates that at some point the Federal Circuit is 
willing to draw the line and declare a claim patent ineligible for claiming subject matter that 
LVQHLWKHUDSURFHVVQRUSURGXFWDVGHÀQHGE\6HFWLRQ54 Similarly, in Bilski II the Court 
H[SOLFLWO\SRLQWHGWRWKHVWDWXWRU\GHÀQLWLRQRISURFHVVDVDOLPLWDWLRQRQSDWHQWHOLJLELOLW\
Moving forward, the courts could potentially adopt a more stringent interpretation of what 
it means to be a patent eligible product or process under section 101 as another doctrinal 
policy lever to regulate claim scope.
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55.  Ariad Pharm. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Rader, J, dissenting).
56.  Research Corp. Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
57.  Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kap-
pos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922, 43923-24 (2010) (emphasis added).
VII. What Role Will Patent Eligibility Play in Policing Claim Scope?
Clearly, under Bilski II the lower courts are empowered to deploy patent eligibility as a 
doctrinal tool for policing claim scope. Because Bilski II leaves the test for patent eligibility 
ODUJHO\XQGHÀQHGWKHORZHUFRXUWVDQG372LQSDUWLFXODUWKH)HGHUDO&LUFXLWFRXOG
actively invoke the doctrine as a “wildcard” to invalidate patent claims deemed unduly 
broad, or otherwise “unworthy” by the court. Judge Rader made a similar observation 
UHFHQWO\ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH/LOO\ZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWDQRWKHUGRFWULQHRI
SDWHQWDELOLW\IRUZKLFKWKHFULWHULDIRUFRPSOLDQFHUHPDLQVODUJHO\XQGHÀQHG55
However, early indications suggest that the Federal Circuit and PTO are disinclined 
to invoke patent eligibility as a front-line doctrinal tool for policing claim scope. There 
are already more appropriate doctrinal tools for policing claim scope, most particularly 
WKHHQDEOHPHQWUHTXLUHPHQWEXWLQFUHDVLQJO\LQUHFHQW\HDUVWKHZULWWHQGHVFULSWLRQ
UHTXLUHPHQW,QPRVWFDVHVWKHVHGRFWULQHVZLOOEHWKHPRUHDSSURSULDWHYHKLFOHIRU
JXDUGLQJDJDLQVWRYHUO\H[SDQVLYHFODLPLQJRILQYHQWLRQV
)RUH[DPSOHLQPrometheus II the Federal Circuit went out of its way to articulate a 
permissive approach to patent eligibility analysis that emphatically supports the patent 
eligibility of method claims reciting a step of administering a drug or otherwise treating a 
patient, or of obtaining and/or analyzing a biological sample from a patient. In Research 
Corporation Technology, a different panel of the Federal Circuit issued a broad holding 
to the effect that any invention providing a functional and palpable application addressing 
a technological need is patent eligible. In that decision, Judge Rader stresses that under 
his interpretation of Bilski II, patent eligibility should not become a substitute for a 
SDWHQWDELOLW\DQDO\VLVUHODWHGWRSULRUDUWDGHTXDWHGLVFORVXUHRURWKHUUHTXLUHPHQWVRI
patentability. In the words of Judge Rader, “section 101 does not permit a court to reject 
VXEMHFWPDWWHUFDWHJRULFDOO\EHFDXVHLWÀQGVWKDWDFODLPLVQRWZRUWK\RIDSDWHQWµ56
6LPLODUO\WKH372KDVLQVWUXFWHGLWVH[DPLQHUVWR´DYRLGIRFXVLQJRQLVVXHVRISDWHQW
eligibility under § 101 to the detriment of considering an application for compliance with 
WKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIDQGDQGDYRLGWUHDWLQJDQDSSOLFDWLRQVROHO\
on the basis of patent-eligibility under § 101 except in the most extreme cases.”57 This 
suggests to me that, like the Federal Circuit, the PTO does not intend to implement Bilski II 
LQDPDQQHUWKDWVXEVWDQWLDOO\DOWHUVWKHFULWHULDIRUSDWHQWDELOLW\DVDSSOLHGE\WKHRIÀFH
In conclusion, at this point in time it seems apparent that while under Bilski II patent 
eligibility is available to the courts and PTO as a doctrinal tool for policing claim scope, 
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early indications are that the doctrine will not be invoked in cases where other doctrines are 
available to accomplish the same end. That said, some situations might very well warrant 
the use of patent eligibility, particularly to police against claims drafted so broadly as to 
encompass mental thoughts, mere analysis or manipulation of data, or other processes too 
far removed from what one would generally characterize as “technology.” 
